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WATER ORGANIZATIONS IN A CHANG* WEST
DIXIMPIT.C21911

Water organizations are the personificaLon of the evolving
tension and, at times, conflict between publiC and private control
of the most precious Western natural resource, water. Viewing this
conflict as a historical paradigm, the current conflict has its
roots in a very early history ironically based on the need for
irrigation districts or water organizations, to supplant the at
times, incompatible conflicts between independent water users and
their strong views of private property with the necessity for
cooperation
cooperation and the development of water as a community or
cooperative enterprise. 1 The Summary Table outlines this as a
historical paradigm. The historical delivery of water by these
organizations, a mixture of public and private, has operated with
relatively little involvement of the general Public. The infamous
description of the hidden government carried forth for a long
period of time wherein general public awareness or concern about
water service or the cost of water was very sporadic at best.
In recent years, however, particularly in the West, water
supplies are evolving from stable agricultural uses to everchanging and increasing urban uses. This has caused different
combinations and reorganization of entities Ito occur as shown in
the Summary Table. The interest and, therefore, scrutiny of the
general public in these new organizational structures for urban
water delivery has increased. Specifically, one very real and

CT

1

N. Hutchins, "Summary of Irrigation District Statutes of Western
States" 2 (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Misc. Publication No. 103, 1931).

direct public focus on this phenomena of urban water transfer has
been the accountability, i.e., regulation and control of these new
or evolving water

delivery organizations.

In determining the level of regulation or scrutiny of such
organizations, however, the first issue is defining what these
organizations are. In a recent study conducted by this
institution, 2 it was evident that one of the more difficult
problems is actually defining or categorizing these various
institutions.

Many

have been organized with their roots in public

law or statute; others with their roots in a cooperative
association of private water right holders.
As we now view these organizations evolving into major players

in the urban water delivery therefore urbanization of the West, the
demand by the general public and the financing community for
accountability is ever increasing. With this focus comes pressure
from the ultimate users, i.e., the water rate payers and taxpayers
to have public oversight or regulation either by statute or
imposition by a regulatory commission. These demands and pressures
initially and naturally cause resistance or a cultural avoidance by
many of these organizations, especially those that evolved out of
a cooperative assembly of private water right holders. This is
particularly true in states such as Utah, Colorado and Idaho where
the majority of the irrigation water delivery organizations
historically have been privately owned. The question remains as to
See generally James N. Corbridge, Jr. Ed. Special Water Districts:
2 '
Malonee for the Future, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado
School of Law, Boulder, Colorado, 1983.

2

pm

where the privately owned water organizations fit. and the
relationship of these organizations to the regulatory authorities.
The focus of regulation has historically been focused on the
requirement of oversight as a regulated publiC utility by a public
service commission in areas when the entity delivers water to the
public generally.

1

As private water organizations become increasingly more active
in delivering water in urban areas, the historic relationship
between the company and its owners and the new urban water users
is becoming somewhat muddled. This has created a situation where
the historic exemptions in many states' public utility laws have
been challenged. Among other arguments for regulation, the
equitable argument is that, in fact, these organizations which
served only their own shareholders are now ° either purposely or
implicitly delivering water to the general public who have a very
small or, in many cases, nonexistent ownership relationship with
the company.
This issue has come to recent focus in the State of Utah and
is illustrative of this tension between regulation of public
utilities and the goals and history of water delivery by private
water organizations.
The Public Service Commission of Utah ("pSC" or "Commission")
is the State agency to which the legislature has delegated the
responsibility of regulating utility companies which have monopoly
power.

3

Traditionally, regulatory commissions have not had a

(Th

significant impact over water service, largely because of the type
of water organization which have historically provided that
service. As shown in the Summary Table, the types of organizations
providing water in, and the type of water provided, fall generally
into the following categories:
1.

Government organizations providing water service;

2. , Privately owned irrigation companiei delivering
water to shareholders for irrigation uses;
3.

Privately owned water companies which provide
either culinary service and/or non-traditional
irrigation service, i.e. residential secondary
water;

4.

Privately owned water companies created by land
developers specifically to serve the needs

of

a

development.
5.

Privately owned water utilities providing either
culinary or secondary water service.

Only the last of the foregoing types fall clearly within the
jurisdiction of regulatory commissions. Pressures from the public
have caused the Utah PSC to examine its possible role and
responsibility to regulate the other categories of water
organizations.
In Utah, like most states, PSC's jurisdiction is based on a
series of definitions set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 which
deal with the type of physical facilities owned, the type of entity

tTh

which owns those facilities and, finally, the class of customers
which are provided the service in order for the utility to be

subject to PSC jurisdiction.
The statutory framework begins by defining "water system"
."Water system" includes all reservoirs, tunnels, shafts,

dams, dikes, headgates, pipes], flumes, canals,
structures, and appliances, and all other real estate,
fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled,
operated, or managed in connection with
or to facilitate
II storage,
supply,
the diversion, development,
distribution, sale, furnishing, carriage, appointment,
apportionment, or measurement of Water for power, fire
protection, irrigation, reclamation', or manufacturing, or
for municipal, domestic, or other l beneficial use. It
does not include private irrigatio4 companies engaged in
distributing water only to their stOckholders.3
3d,lc
This broad definition of water system, e luding only "private
irrigation companies" allows for the inclusiOn by the PSC of most
systems.
The statute then goes from the type of system to the type of
entity owning the system:
"Water corporation" includes every corporation and
person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning,
controlling, operating, or managing any water system or
public service within this state. It does not include
private irrigation companies engaged in distributing
water only through their stockholders, or towns, cities,
counties, water conservancy districts, improvement
districts, or other governmental 'entities created or
organized under any general or Special law of this
state.'
In order to determine whether the Commission's jurisdiction
applies to water corporations, the following definition is applied:

3

Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(35).

4

Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(34).

5

"Public utility" includes every
, water corporation
. . . where the service is performed for, or the
commodity delivered to, the public generally . . . .3
The above statutes have traditionally been applied to exclude from

Commission jurisdiction municipalities as well as mutual water
companies and are typical of most state statutes In the West. The
argument for exclusion of mutual water companies is generally based
on the premise that such companies only serve their own
stockholders, and therefore do not provide service to the "public
generally" as required by S 54-2-1(19)(a).4
As is apparent from the definitions cited above, privately
owned irrigation companies distributing water only to their
shareholders are not included within the definition of either
"water system" or "water corporation." The Utah PSC in a recent
rule making' quoted the statutory definitions:
The Utah Code gives the Commission jurisdiction over
"water corporations" but specifically exempts "private
irrigation companies engaged in distributing water only
to their shareholders."
The statute does not define "irrigation," but in Utah,
the term has a decidedly agriculture (=notation, as
evidenced by the fact, of which we take administrative
notice, that a distinction is customarily drawn (for very
good, human health - related reasons) between
"irrigation" and "culinary" -water."

5

Utah Code Ann. 5 S4-2-1(19)(9); figg Also e.a. Loma 1978 (1992 Cam
Supp.) 9 62-3-1 et seq.
4

221 ALAS SMSA 1978 (1992 Cum. S uP10. ) i 62-3-4(A), excluding Person
supplying water only to himself, his tenants, or employees.

In The matter of the Amendment to 'Ala R746:331, Exemption of
Mutually owned water Companies from Commission Regulation, Docket MO. 91-391-01,
June 12, 1992, Utah Public Service CoMmission.

Id. at 3-4.
6

(Th The PSC then used that distinction to justify its promulgation
of a rule which allows the PSc to assert, in special circumstances,
jurisdiction over culinary mutual water companies:
Under the familiar cannon of statutOry construction that
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, we conclude that
cooperatives furnishing culinary water to their members
are not explicitly exempted from our jurisdiction by
statute. The conclusion is not unreasonable or
arbitrary; the provision of culinary water is fraught
with a wide and crucial public interest, justifying
treatment different from rurally ,Ibased agriculture oriented co-ops.9
In that rule making, the Utah Commission also noted another
rationale restricting the Commission's jurisdiction over mutual
water companies or co-ops. Specifically, citing an older Utah
case" they noted that the Utah Supreme Court found that an
rcity only to its
electric cooperative which provided electi
flstockholder members did not provide service to the "public
generally" and was therefore outside of the jurisdiction of the
Public Service Commission. Other courts haVs similarly reviewed
the actual practice over the institutional form to evaluate the
issue of jurisdiction. For example, Justice Traynor went behind
the corporate structure of a mutual water company and reviewed the
actual function to make the jurisdictional determination."

9

id. at 4.
11

10

Garkane Power Company. Inc. v. PSC , 100 p.2d 571 (Utah 1940).

Yucaipa Water Co. v. Public Utilities COmmission, 357 P.2d 795
(California, 1960); see also Nelson v. Lake Canal Co. rpf Colorado 644 P.2d 55
(Colo. App., 1981) (distinguishing mutual water company from carrier ditch
companies).
11
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There are two situations in the urbanization of water where a
mutual water company may provide more than purely agricultural
water service to its stockholders which invite regulatory scrutiny.
The first is when a mutual water company is the logical and at
times only entity to provide culinary service in an area. In some
situations, as formerly rural areas have become more urbanized,
mutual water companies now provide culinary service to heretofore
nonexistent suburban communities.
A variation on the foregoing occurs where mutual water
companies have begun providing pressurized, secondary water service
to more urbanized areas, sometimes to stockholders only and
sometimes pursuant to arrangements with local governmental
entities. Again, these arrangements do not seem to be the target
of the regulators, including Utah and would likely be excluded by
the Commission's "culinary" versus "irrigation" dichotomy. It is
unclear, however, whether the Utah PSC meant to exclude secondary
water service to a residential Area from that which it believes
should be regulated or whether such service would be defined as
exempted irrigation in other states.
If desirable certain arguments against regulatory jurisdiction
are available to water organizations which find themselves the
subject of regulatory scrutiny.
To the extent that mutual water companies provide either
culinary or secondary water service to the citizens of a
governmental entity, those companies may choose to enter into
interlocal agreements with public entities where state statutes
1

8

allow such public/private contractual cooperation. In Utah, a
1

recently enacted statute allows a politicalo subdivision of the
state (which includes municipalities, county improvement districts,
water conservancy districts, special service l districts, drainage
districts, metropolitan water districts, irrigation districts or
separate entities created under the Interlocal Cooperation Act) to
chose to "privatize" the provision of certain services with a
1

private company. The type of public services covered include
drinking water, water, and waste water collection, treatment and
disposal services. Through such an agreement, termed
"privatization project agreement", the locald governmental entity
and the private water company or individuals watering together can
in effect craft the manner in which service

will

be provided and

the rates which may be charged. To clarify the regulation issue,
the Utah statute specifically provides that the "private
owner/operator is not a 'public utility'." This may be a model
for other states to examine where the meshi0 of privately held
water rights into public water service is a Possible variation of
,
the regulatory exemption wherein the public .!entity could be the
ultimate deliverer of retail service from water provided by the
private water company or individuals. However, the issue of
accountability and serving the public generally is still
important."

12

Utah Cods Ann. 5 73-10d-5(0.

13

AAA Xucaina pps. 298-299.

9

The major impetus behind the Utah rulemaking, and the focus of
other state commissions' and court scrutiny are the perceived
problems with land developers who create a mutual water company to
provide service to a development, and thereafter provide a share or
fraction of a share to persons who purchase lots as a prerequisite
to receiving water service. It is argued that such developers can
retain unchallenged control of the companies by retaining the
majority of share ownership, thereby effectively denying most
persons receiving water a role or voice in the affairs of the
company.
As a consequence, in Utah it was ultimately agreed that
asserting jurisdiction over mutual water companies was appropriate
with respect to certain companies where control is concentrated.
In promulgating the rule, the Utah Commission closely reviewed the
language of the Garkane case, which exempted co-operatives where
service was provided to shareholders only. Specifically, the
Commission quoted the following language from the Garkane case:
The Courts will always scrutinize closely to determine
whether or not a certain organization or method conduct
has for its purpose evasion of the law, and where it
finds such evasion will declare such organization to be
what it truly is.
•

•

•

We hold, therefore, that a non-profit electric
cooperative which serves only its members, and is
completely consumer owned with each consumer limited to
one membership, is not a public utility within the
purview of our statute."

14

=aim

at 573 and 574.
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In its rule making, the PSC used Garkane to conclude as
follows:
We conclude that, regardless of historical practice, if
culinary water co-ops wish to bring themselves within the
exemption delineated in Garkane, they are going to have
to meet all the criteria established in that case, which
includes equal voting rights for all members of the coop.

It follows that ownership and voting rights are
legitimate subjects of inquiry for the Commission in
making a jurisdictional determination. We are unwilling
to say that any violation of a "one V- owner - one - vote"
rule will, ins° facto, put an entity within our
jurisdiction, but in making that determination we will
scrutinize closely any entity in which voting control is
likely to remain in one or a u few hands for any
substantial time. It will be the burden of the entity
claiming exemption to show that thevother members are in
some fashion otherwise adequately protected.15
The language of R746-331 which governs, this issue requires
that the Commission upst conclude, in order to exempt a company
from jurisdiction, that "voting control of the entity is
distributed in a way that each member enjoys a v complete commonality
of interest, as a consumer, such that rate regulation would be
superfluous . . . R 746-331-1C. Obviously, this language can be
used to argue that most mutual water companies, of whatever kind,
should not and do not fall within the Commission's jurisdiction.
If a mutual water company, whether it prpvides secondary or
culinary service, has its shares widely dispersed among
shareholders such that no one person or group controls the company,
and therefore, rates, a regulatory commission is unlikely to assert
jurisdiction.

15

puora note 2, at 10.

11

The difficulty is in predicting the meaning and application of
"commonality of interest" or similar terms. Such an inquiry will
require the commission or courts to review, in detail, the
corporate workings of any company which is brought to their
attention. Courts have generally gone to the specific factual
context to make this determination and there appears to be a
presumption of regulatory jurisdiction inherent in the rulings.

16

See especially, Aewandowski v. Brookwood Musconetcona giver. -etc.
Association, 181 A.28 1506 (Nai. 1962) where the court concluded, 'As the
character and extent of the use make it public, we conclude the [water
organisation) is operating a water system for 'public use." at 513, endorsed
in Griffith v. New Mexico Public Service Commission 520 P.2d 269 (N.M. 1966).
12
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SUMMARY TABLE
"Overview of Public and Private Options for Evolving Water Organizations"

1.
2.
3.
4.

Maximum general public involvement.
Maximum financial integrity.
Minimum public liability.
Maximum private property rights.

Parenzsgs
Combined
Interlocal Entity

Public/Private

low
medium
low
med
low
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